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ADVERSE POSSESSION
I. INTRODUCTION
"In property law, it is a straightforward proposition that, under certain conditions,
title to property may, by operation of law, be transferred to another without compen-
sation. In constitutional law, it is a straightforward proposition that the government
cannot take private property without just compensation. This court must determine
how these two propositions interact with each other. Although the defendant con-
tends that the two areas of law are 'mutually exclusive,' they are not."1
During the past five years, the Pascoag' decisions have ignited contro-
versy surrounding the issue of whether a governmental entity has the ability to
acquire privately-held property without just compensation and by means of
adverse possession.3 These decisions have been considered a hot topic in the
legal community, as some legal scholars believe that utilizing adverse posses-
sion in favor of the government is a new area of the law that could have
profound effects on the way the government acquires privately-held property.4
Others believe that these decisions represent a new and direct attack on the
federal and state constitutions that have always prevented governmental bodies
from taking privately-held property, unless compensation has been granted.5
What both groups fail to realize is that adverse possession6 has been applied in
favor of the government sporadically over the past one hundred years, but with-
1 Judge Ronald R. Lagueux, Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp.
2d 206, 209 (D.R.I. 2002).
2 See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2003); Pas-
coag, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206; Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826 (R.I.
2001).
3 See Holly Doremus, Takings and Transitions, 19 J. LAND USE & ENvTL. L. 1 (2003)
(arguing that the Pascoag district court decision is flawed based on its application of the
facts); Kimberly A. Selemba, Comment, The Interplay Between Property Law and Constitu-
tional Law: How the Government (Un)constitutionally "Takes" Land Dirt Cheap, 108
PENN. ST. L. REv. 657, 668-77 (2003) (discussing the implications of the Pascoag decisions
and arguing that any time a governmental entity takes property it is required to pay just
compensation); Feature Case: Adverse Possession as a Taking?, TAKINGS WATCH (Com-
munity Rts. Counsel, Washington D.C.), Aug. 2003, at 1, available at http://community
rights.org/PDFs/Newsletters/August2003.pdf (discussing the Pascoag decisions and how
"bizarre" it is for a government to cause a taking through adverse possession); Joseph Wil-
liam Singer, New Developments in Property Law (June 24, 2005), http://www.law.harvard.
edu/faculty/jsinger/developments/singerpropertydev.pdf (discussing implications of the Pas-
coag decisions as a new development in property law).
4 See sources cited supra note 3.
5 See Selemba, supra note 3, at 658 (arguing that the state is always subject to the Fifth
Amendment and thus a taking occurs when a state acquires title through adverse possession);
see also Resolve Against Property Takings' Organized Resistance (RAPTOR), Fighting
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources Seizure of Private Property for Snowmobile &
ATV Trails, http://snow.prohosting.com/rights/index.htm (arguing that the use of adverse
possession. by a governmental entity is unjust and inconsistent with the constitution) (last
visited Apr. 10, 2007).
6 The decisions cited within this Article have used both adverse possession and prescription.
Although the author recognizes that there is a distinction between acquiring rights through
adverse possession compared to prescription, the terms may be used interchangeably
throughout this Article for convenience. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES
§ 2.17 cmt. a (2000) (providing an overview of the differences between adverse possession
and prescription); William G. Ackerman & Shane T. Johnson, Comment, Outlaws of the
Past: A Western Perspective on Prescription and Adverse Possession, 31 LAND & WATER
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out great recognition. 7 Nevertheless, the concept of governmental adverse pos-
session is hardly clear. For example, most of the existing case law lacks
thorough analysis8 or uniform application9 of the interplay between adverse
possession and the takings doctrine, which makes this area of law unstable,
unclear, and incomprehensible. 10 The lack of scholarly or practical materials
on this topic has also contributed to the misunderstanding."
To most in the legal community, as Judge Lagueux mentions, adverse pos-
session and the takings doctrine are considered separate legal theories and thus
mutually exclusive.' 2 It is certainly easy to embrace this school of thought, as
it is common legal knowledge that both federal and state constitutions prevent
any governmental body from acquiring property without some procedural
guidelines for just compensation.' 3 Allowing the government to take property
through adverse possession, which does not require compensation but rewards
a wrongful trespasser with title to property, is unjust and contrary to our system
of property rights. This line of reasoning is also supported by the fact that land
held by a governmental body has been traditionally immune from claims of
adverse possession by private individuals.' 4 So the argument goes, why should
L. REV. 79, 81-91 (1996) (distinguishing prescriptive rights and rights obtained through
adverse possession).
7 See Ian H. Hlawati, Comment, Loko i'a: A Legal Guide to the Restoration of Native
Hawaiian Fishponds Within the Western Paradigm, 24 U. HAW. L. REV. 657 (2002) (dis-
cussing how Hawaiian fish pond owners face the threat of adverse possession by the state
and by private individuals). See also David Casanova, Comment, The Possibility and Con-
sequences of the Recognition of Prescriptive Avigation Easements by State Courts, 28 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 399 (2001) (noting the ability of municipal airports to acquire prescrip-
tive easements for flights over private property through adverse use). See generally A. M.
Vann, Annotation, Acquisition of Title to Land by Adverse Possession by State or Other
Governmental Unit or Agency, 18 A.L.R. 3d 678 (1968) (providing a comprehensive factual
evaluation of how adverse possession has been applied in favor a governmental entity and
offering a helpful table of cases from within the fifty states. Note, however, that there are
key decisions that have not been updated within this Article.).
8 See, e.g., Miner v. Yantis, 102 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. 1951) (claiming that there is a general
rule allowing governmental entities to possess private property adversely but failing to artic-
ulate any rationale for the holding, while relying on a legal encyclopedia as authority).
9 See infra Section IV.
" See Selemba, supra note 3, at 675 ("Currently, courts across the nation disagree over
whether a state that acquires property by adverse possession or prescriptive easement must
compensate the property owner because it triggers the Takings Clause of the United States
Constitution.").
1" Currently there are few scholarly articles that attempt to address the interplay between
adverse possession and the takings doctrine. See Martin J. Foncello, Comment, Adverse
Possession and Takings Seldom Compensation for Chance Happenings, 35 SETON HALL L.
REV. 667 (2005); Selemba, supra note 3, at 657; Vann, supra note 7, at 678. See also
R.K.G., Recent Cases, 26 WASH. L. REV. & ST. BAR. J. 231 (1951) (noting that there is a
surprising lack of case law discussing the government's ability to acquire property by
adverse possession).
12 Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.R.I. 2002).
13 See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V. See, e.g., COLO. CoNsT. art. II, § 15 (providing an example
of a typical state just compensation clause).
" See Walter Quentin Impert, Comment, Whose Land is it Anyway?: It's Time to Recon-
sider Sovereign Immunity from Adverse Possession, 49 UCLA L. REV. 447, 449 (2001)
("Although the government authorizes adverse possession, it exempts itself from these stat-
utes under the doctrine of sovereign immunity."); Carl C. Risch, Comment, Encouraging the
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the government be able to possess privately-held land adversely when private
individuals are usually prevented from adversely possessing land owned by the
government?' 5
Courts addressing the interplay between adverse possession and takings
law have applied several legal theories to refute the argument that acquiring
property through adverse possession amounts to a taking.' 6 Courts were quick
to recognize that a municipal corporation has the ability to act in a private
capacity, distinct from its state-granted authority, thus avoiding any state action
arguments that would trigger constitutional protections.17 Other courts argue
that they have not applied adverse possession in the traditional sense, but they
have applied an adverse possession statute of limitations to an inverse condem-
nation claim when a state has failed to legislate on the issue specifically. 8
Finally, there is an area of case law that has simply applied adverse possession
in favor of a governmental body under an equitable theory to avoid injustice in
title disputes. 9 Overall, the courts have not been consistent in their applica-
tion, which has resulted in split decisions 2° and a misunderstanding of the pur-
pose of each doctrine and how they should interact, if at all.E'
This Article clarifies how the courts have addressed the interplay between
adverse possession and the takings doctrine and argues that the use of adverse
possession is unnecessary because well-settled takings jurisprudence would
Responsible Use of Land by Municipalities: The Erosion of Nullum Tempus Occurrit Regi
and the Use of Adverse Possession Against Municipal Land Owners, 99 DICK. L. REV. 197,
197 (1994) (noting that adverse possession has been historically prohibited against land held
by the government).
'5 JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 162 n.26 (5th ed. 2002) ("Given that a
private party may not be able to get government property by adverse possession, is it fair that
the government is nevertheless able to get private property by adverse possession?").
16 See infra Section IV.
1' See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901, 906-08 (5th Cir.
1987).
18 See Wadsworth v. Dep't of Transp., 915 P.2d 1, 4 (Idaho 1996) (recognizing that inverse
condemnation claims can be limited by applying a state's statute of limitations for acquiring
property rights by prescription).
19 See, e.g., United States v. Stanton, 495 F.2d 515, 515-17 (5th Cir. 1974) (government
obtained title from a co-tenant who appeared to have authority to convey the entire interest,
but he did not, and the court applied adverse possession as an alternative to the claim of valid
title); Ault v. State, 688 P.2d 951, 956 (Alaska 1984) (Adverse possession should be nar-
rowly construed in favor of the state and applied only when the state had and "honest and
reasonable belief in the validity of title."); Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd. v. Ruston Coll., 162 So.
2d 419, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1964) ("If public bodies or political corporations were prohibited
from acquiring by prescription, such defects as may exist in a title to property acquired by
purchase or donation could never be cured .... "). See also infra Section IV.C.4.
20 Compare Weidner v. State Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860 P.2d 1205, 1212
(Alaska 1993), Commonwealth Dep't of Parks v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712-13 (Ky.
1966), In re S. Ry. Co. Paving Assessment 147 S.E. 301, 304 (N.C. 1929), and State ex rel.
A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985) with Pascoag Reservoir
& Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2003), Pascoag Reservoir & Dam,
LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224 (D.R.I. 2002), and Johnson v. City of Mt.
Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985). See also Selemba, supra note 3, at 657-58
(recognizing that two prevailing views exist when considering adverse possession by a gov-
ernmental entity).
21 See infra Section IV.
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obtain a similar result for the government and more favorable rulings for pri-
vate landowners. The use of takings law would assume that any time a govern-
ment body enters land without permission or creates a burdensome regulation, a
potential takings claim accrues and the appropriate time period would apply in
order to bring an inverse condemnation claim. At the same time, it would
reject any claim that the government can act in a private capacity in an attempt
avoid potential takings claims. Traditional takings law is necessary to avoid
the inconsistencies that result from the introduction of adverse possession into
this area of law and to remove another hurdle standing in the way of private
landowners from seeking compensation. Finally, preventing the government
from utilizing adverse possession would be consistent with the property rights
movement by legitimizing the underlying purpose of the Takings Clause."2
Section II.A. of this Article provides a brief overview of adverse posses-
sion while Section II.B. provides an overview of the takings doctrine. After
discussing the foundations of each, Section III provides an overview of United
States Supreme Court decisions that have been relied upon as authority for the
government to possess private property adversely. Finally, Section IV provides
an overview of how courts have applied adverse possession in favor of a gov-
ernment body and how the author's proposal responds to these decisions. Sec-
tion V closes with a recommendation that takings analysis be the exclusive
method for resolving such property disputes with government entities.
II. BACKGROU1D
A. Understanding Adverse Possession
1. Historical Background
Adverse possession and productive land use have deep roots in early
Roman and Feudal law.2 3 The most significant development, for purposes of
American common law, evolved in England during the feudal period.2 4 During
this time, property rights were held by the monarchy through a system of hered-
ity.2 5 Land was granted by the king to the people, not to own, but to use on the
king's behalf.26 This system of land use was unique because it allowed for a
property owner to remove an illegal trespasser by "ousting" him with force, and
if the owner failed to exercise his right, he lost the ousting privilege. 27
The concept of adverse possession was born in England around 1275 and
was initially created to allow a person to claim rights of "seisin" from his
22 The property rights movement can be collectively considered a group of like-minded
persons who lobby for the protection of property free from governmental intrusion. See,
e.g., MARK L. POLLOT, GRAND THEFT AND PETIT LARCENY: PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICA
163 (1993) (a good example of the property rights movement can be seen through this source
published by the The Pacific Legal Foundation and arguing for a more consistent approach
to takings law while rejecting the "ad hoc" approach taken by most courts today).
23 JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 436 (2000).
24 Id. at 80-81.
25 Id. at 81.
26 Id.
27 Brian Gardiner, Comment, Squatters' Rights and Adverse Possession: A Search for
Equitable Application of Property Laws, 8 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 119, 125-26 (1997).
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ancestry. 28 Many felt that the original law that relied on "seisin" was difficult
to establish, and around 1623 a statute of limitations was put into place that
allowed for a person in possession of property for twenty years or more to
acquire title to that property.29 This early English doctrine was designed to
prevent legal disputes over property rights that were time consuming and
costly. 30 The doctrine was also created to prevent the waste of land by forcing
owners to monitor their property or suffer the consequence of losing title.3'
The concept of adverse possession was subsequently adopted in the United
States.32 The doctrine was especially important in early American periods to
cure the growing number of title disputes.33 The American version mirrored
the English, which is illustrated by most states' adoption of a twenty-year stat-
ute of limitations for adverse possession claims.34 As America has developed
to the present date, property rights have become increasingly more important
and land has become limited. As a result, the time period to acquire land by
adverse possession has been reduced in some states to as little as five years,
while in others, it has remained as long as forty years.35 The United States has
also changed the traditional doctrine by preventing the use of adverse posses-
sion against property held by a governmental entity.36
2. Adverse Possession in Modern America
The elements to prove adverse possession are generally consistent from
one state to another; thus a detailed discussion is not necessary for this article.
The first element, actual possession, requires some form of physical entry by
the squatter onto the land and use of the land as a reasonable owner would use
that particular piece of land.37 The second element, open and notorious posses-
sion, requires that the squatter's possession be so obvious that a reasonable
owner, when inspecting the property, would be on notice that someone is using
his land without permission.3" The third element, exclusive possession,
requires the squatter to use the land while not sharing it with the general public
or with the original owner (although most courts do not require absolute exclu-
sivity).39 The fourth element requires possession to be hostile, adverse, or
under a claim of right, but the majority rule among the states only requires the
squatter to "use the land as a reasonable owner would use it - without permis-
28 Id. at 126.
29 Id. at 126-27.
30 Id. at 127.
31 SPRANKLINO, supra note 23, at 437.
32 Id.; Gardiner, supra note 27, at 129 (suggesting that North Carolina was the first state to
adopt an adverse possession statute of limitation around 1715).
33 SPRANKLING, supra note 23, at 437.
34 Gardiner, supra note 27, at 128.
35 Ackerman, supra note 6, at 111-12 (providing a comprehensive list of adverse possession
statutes from each of the fifty states).
36 See sources cited supra note 14.
17 SPRANKLING, supra note 23, at 438 (providing a basic overview of the elements required
to prove a claim).
38 Id. at 440.
39 Id. at 439-40.
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sion from the true owner."4 The fifth element, continuous possession, requires
that the squatter make use of the land incessantly without interruption, as a
reasonable owner of that tract of land, for the statutory period.4'
Assuming a party satisfies the elements for a prima facie case, the adverse
possessor obtains title in fee, which divests title from the rightful owner and
bars him from obtaining any remedy against the trespasser.42 However, if a
trespasser has failed to meet the statutory time requirement, the rightful owner
can remove the trespasser by bringing a claim of ejectment.4 3
B. Understanding the Takings Doctrine
1. Historical Background
During the colonial period, prior to the enactment of the Bill of Rights,
property was frequently taken by states from private landowners without com-
pensation. 44 Initially, undeveloped tracts of land were the most common type
of property acquired by the government, as they were sought for the installation
of public roads.45 Under the colonial system it was thought that "benefits from
the road would, in newly opened country, always exceed the value of unim-
proved land."46
The idea that private property was deserving of protection was not well
accepted during the Colonial period.47 The justification for an uncompensated
taking was based on Republican ideologies that encompassed several ratio-
nales, the first of which was the belief in the common good of society and that
a citizen's loss of property was a sacrifice for the greater good of the public.4 8
Additionally, possession and the pursuit of property were seen as corruptive
influences.49 As a result of prevailing Republican ideals, state constitutions did
not have just compensation clauses because the general public had faith in their
legislatures to define individual rights.50 The legislature was also thought to be
an unbiased body that was shielded from influence by the governor.5 '
40 Id. at 442 (emphasis omitted). See also id. at 441-44 (distinguishing the three approaches
used in the United States: objective, good faith, and intentional trespass).
41 Id. at 444-45 (therefore, if the property involves a summer beach house that is only used
in the summer, possession during each summer would suffice if the other elements are met.).
42 See JOHN R. BARLOW II & DONALD M. VONCANNON, SKELTON ON THE LEGAL ELE-
MENTS OF BOUNDARIES & ADJACENT PROPERTIES 423 (2d ed. 1997).
41 See Paula R. Latovick, Adverse Possession of Municipal Land: It's Time to Protect This
Valuable Asset, 31 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 475, 475 (1998) ("The doctrine of adverse posses-
sion provides that an owner of land may lose the title to his land if he fails to eject trespass-
ers promptly.").
I See William Michael Treanor, Note, The Origins and Original Significance of the Just
Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 694-95 (1985). But see
WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK, NONTRESPASSORY TAKINGS IN EMINENT DOMAIN 10 (1977) (noting
that compensation was paid during the colonial period for improved land).
45 STOEBUCK, supra note 44, at 9-10.
46 ld at 10.
47 See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
48 Treanor, supra note 44, at 699-700.
49 Id. at 699.
50 Id. at 700-01.
51 Id.
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Around the late 1780s, theories concerning property rights began to evolve
from the Republican ideology to a more liberal view where interests in individ-
ual property rights emerged.52 Historians believe that this evolution was
caused by a change in perception of the state legislatures from one of trust to
distrust.5 3 By 1800, several states enacted just compensation clauses, including
Vermont, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.54 These new clauses required the
state to compensate a landowner for any taking of private property, regardless
of whether the land was for the installation of a public roadway.5
Another important development in the protection of property rights was
the Fifth Amendment. James Madison was the drafter and key supporter for
the Fifth Amendment.5 6 Madison's justifications for the amendment were
derived from his unique understanding of property rights.5 7 He believed that
the concept of property encompassed not only rights in land, but also a panoply
of other personal liberties such as the right of any person to his own opinion
and the ability to express that opinion.5 8 To this end he believed that rights in
property were so broad and essential to mankind that the role of a just govern-
ment was to "protect property of every sort."' 9 Madison and the Framers
believed the Bill of Rights combined with an effective judiciary were necessary
to provide a standard of judicial review for actions by the federal govern-
ment.6 ° Thus "[a] government that provided compensation when it took real or
personal property demonstrated its commitment to personal freedom."6 1 On
the other hand, if the government took property without judicial review, it
would dishonor its commitment to personal freedom by violating the land in
which citizens enjoy their personal freedom to associate, practice religion, and
speak freely.62
The passage of the Bill of Rights was considered an Anti-Federalist vic-
tory, and by 1820 the just compensation clauses had won general acceptance
among the states.63 The Bill of Rights has forever changed the way that prop-
erty is transferred within the United States.' In fact, Madisonian ideas have
had such a profound impact on American property rights that many claim he
"championed the interests of property."65
52 POLLOT, supra note 22, at 35-36.
53 Id. at 15-16, 19 (colonists found their legislatures to be untrustworthy due to their con-
stant interference with property rights).
5' Id. at 44-45. "By the late 1780s the philosophy of natural rights was clearly entrenched
in America . . . [which included] 'absolute rights of property."' Id. at 35.
55 Id. at 44-45.
56 Id. at 45.
17 See James Madison, Property, NAT'L GAzETTE, Mar. 27, 1792, reprinted in 1 THE FOUN-
DERS CoNsnTUrIoN 598-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lemer eds., 1987).
58 Id. at 598.
59 Id.
60 POLLOT, supra note 22, at 27.
61 Treanor, supra note 44, at 712.
62 Id.
63 POLLOT, supra note 22, at 45.
64 Id.
65 Treanor, supra note 44, at 709.
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2. Modern Takings Claims
The Fifth Amendment states: "nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation. 66 Today, the main issue in takings juris-
prudence is determining when property rights are "taken" so as to require just
compensation. There are primarily two situations when a landowner may
obtain compensation for land officially transferred to or depreciated by the
government.
67
First, an owner may be entitled to compensation when a governmental
entity intentionally acquires private property through a formal condemnation
proceeding and without the owner's consent.68 The state's power to take prop-
erty is considered inherent through its eminent domain powers as a sovereign.69
Through the condemnation proceeding, the government obtains the necessary
interest in the land, and the Fifth Amendment requires that the property owner
be compensated for his lOSS. 70
The second situation requiring compensation under Fifth Amendment
occurs when the government has not officially acquired private property
through a formal condemnation proceeding, but "nonetheless takes property by
physically invading or appropriating it. ''71 Under this scenario, the property
owner, at the point in which a "taking" has occurred, has the option of filing a
claim against the government actor to recover just compensation for the lOSS. 72
When the landowner sues the government seeking compensation for a taking, it
is considered an inverse condemnation proceeding, because the landowner and
not the government is bringing the cause of action.7 3
So if the government does not formally condemn land, how does a land-
owner know when his property has been "taken?" Over the years case law has
established a means of determining when a taking has occurred through two
basic concepts: physical takings and regulatory takings.7" A physical taking
typically involves: "trespass on, invasion of, or occupation by a governmental
entity of an owner's private property."75 On the other hand, a "regulatory tak-
ing is the result of government regulating a property's use in a way that unrea-
sonably diminishes its value without physically occupying it. '"76
' U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67 See JAN G. LAITOS, LAW OF PROPERTY RIGHTS PROTECTION: LIMITATIONS ON GOVERN-
MENTAL POWERS 8-13 (2006).
68 See id.
69 STOEBUCK, supra note 44, at 4 (discussing the historical implications of eminent domain).
70 LAITOS, supra note 67, at 8-13.
71 Id. at 8-17, 8-18 ("[Cjlassic inverse condemnation occurs by physical appropriation
.. .. .).
72 See id. at 8-16.
73 See id.
74 See BARLOW BURKE, UNDERSTANDING THE LAW OF ZONING AND LAND USE CONTROLS
23-32 (2002).
75 Id. at 23. See also Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (holding that "a permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve").
76 BURKE, supra note 74, at 30. See also Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415
(1922) ("The general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent,
if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.").
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A landowner must demonstrate several elements to bring a successful
inverse condemnation claim against the government.7 7 First, the landowner
must prove that he owns private property and that his rights are protected under
state or federal constitutions.7 8 State law usually defines property interests and
whether such interests are deserving of constitutional protection.79 Real prop-
erty is the most common type of private property deserving protection; how-
ever, real property encompasses various interests that are often not deserving of
80protection.
Second, the landowner must consider timing issues when deciding
whether to bring a claim, including ripeness and mootness. If the claim is
brought too early, it will be considered not yet ripe and dismissed; on the other
hand, if it is brought too late, it will be considered moot and dismissed as
well.8" The most important timing question is whether the statute of limitations
has run in order to bring the inverse claim. The statutory time period to bring a
claim begins to run when the taking has "accrued. ' 82 An inverse condemnation
claim usually accrues when the property owner has been permanently deprived
of the land or when the elements of a physical or regulatory taking are met.
8
1
Once it is determined when the claim accrued, the appropriate statutory time
period should be determined. The time period to bring an inverse claim is
established either by a specific statute of limitations for inverse condemnation
claims or if none exists, the time period to acquire land by adverse posses-
sion.84 Bringing a timely claim is crucial because the United States Supreme
7 See generally 2A JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.03 (2006) (dis-
cussing how procedural issues often prevent a landowner from bringing a successful takings
claim).
78 MICHAEL A. ZIZKA ET AL., STATE & LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAND USE LIABILITY § 12:25
(2004); LAITOS, supra note 67, at 9-3 ("When the Takings Clause refers to 'private prop-
erty,' this phrase most obviously includes physical things, particularly real property.").
79 See LAITOS, supra note 67, at 4-16; ZIZKA ET AL., supra note 78.
80 LAITOS, supra note 67, at 9-4, 9-5 ("[T]his 'sticks-in-a-bundle' model of property has
resulted in the Supreme Court acknowledgement that some rights of ownership (e.g., the
right to exclude, the right of descent and devise, the right to have some economically viable
use of property) are more protected by the Takings Clause than others (e.g., the right to
make the most profitable use of one's land).").
81 Id. at 10-5.
82 Id. at 10-7.
83 Id. at 10-7 n3. But see DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 1230 (suggesting that
sometimes it is unclear as to when a regulatory taking claim accrues and that it could be
when the regulation is enacted or when the government refuses compensation). See also
United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947) (determining when a takings claim accrues
after a property owner's land has been flooded by the government).
84 See 27 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain §§ 794-795 (2004). See generally Charles C. Mar-
vel, Annotation, State Statute of Limitations Applicable to Inverse Condemnation or Similar
Proceeding by Landowner to Obtain Compensation for Direct Appropriation of Land With-
out the Institution or Conclusion of Formal Proceedings Against Specific Owner, 26
A.L.R.4th 68 (1983) (providing an overview of how different states limit the time period to
file an inverse condemnation claim, if no statutory period exists, and recognizing that often
the time period of adverse possession is used if no period exists). But see ZIZKA ET AL.,
supra note 78, at § 12:22 (suggesting that a tort statute of limitations may apply).
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Court has held that constitutional rights can be barred by a statute of limita-
tions, thus preventing claims for compensation.
8 5
The next step in bringing a successful inverse claim is proving that the
taking was caused by an act of the government or its agent and not a third
party.8 6 Typically this involves a showing that the government "authorized the
act that brought about the taking."87 Assuming the prior requirements can be
met, the party seeking compensation must prove that his rights were diminished
through either a physical or regulatory taking.88 Finally, there must be proof
that the property was taken for public use.89
III. U.S. SUPREME COURT DECISIONS SUPPORTING THE USE OF ADVERSE
POSSESSION BY A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY?
A diligent researcher will be hard-pressed to find authority by the United
States Supreme Court granting either the federal or state governments the abil-
ity to use adverse possession as an alternative to eminent domain. However,
Stanley v. Schwalby9 ° and Texaco, Inc. v. Short9 1 are often cited for this pro-
position.9 2 Reliance on these decisions is misplaced for many reasons. First,
neither decision suggests that a governmental entity can use adverse possession
to acquire property for any purpose and certainly not as an alternative to emi-
nent domain.93 Second, neither decision specifically addresses the use of
adverse possession by a governmental entity or the interplay between adverse
possession and the takings doctrine.9 4
85 United States v. Dickinson, 331 U.S. 745 (1947); Wadsworth v. Dep't of Transp., 915
P.2d 1, 3-4 (Idaho 1996) (arguing that United States v. Dickinson provides authority to limit
the time period to file an inverse condemnation claim); Carol Necole Brown, Taking the
Takings Claim: A Policy and Economic Analysis of the Survival of Takings Claims After
Property Transfers, 36 CONN. L. REv. 7, 48 (2003) (recognizing that takings claims are
subject to statutes of limitation). See generally Tyler T. Ochoa & Andrew J. Wistrich, The
Puzzling Purposes of Statutes of Limitation, 28 PAC. L.J. 453 (1997) (discussing the histori-
cal and modem purposes of statute of limitations).
86 See LAITOS, supra note 67, at 10-48.3, 10-48.6.
87 See id. at 10-48.11.
88 ZIZKA ET AL., supra note 78, at § 12:3 (providing a basic overview of physical and regu-
latory taking claims).
89 LAITOS, supra note 67, at 12-3 to 12-20 (the public use requirement is met when the
property is made available to the public and for the public's benefit, but noting that there are
some difficulties in determining whether a use is for the public). See also Kelo v. City of
New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (suggesting that "public use" is a broad concept).
90 147 U.S. 508 (1893).
91 454 U.S. 516 (1982).
92 See cases cited infra notes 124, 127.
93 Foncello, supra note 11, at 678-79 ("[C]ourts erroneously rely on Texaco, Inc. v. Short
for the proposition that land acquired by a governmental entity through adverse possession is
not subject to a takings claim .... In fact, the case is not even about adverse possession.").
94 Id.
[Vol. 7:348
ADVERSE POSSESSION
A. Stanley v. Schwalby
Stanley involved a dispute between several parties who had received title
to the same tract of land from a common grantor.9 5 The plaintiff held valid title
as the first party to receive the conveyance.9 6 The United States received the
second conveyance for the same tract several years later as a gift and with
notice of the plaintiffs interest in the property.97 Some time after the United
States received title and began using the property as a military base, the plain-
tiff sued the three officers of the United States military for trespass because
they were using the property without permission.98 The United States was later
brought into the suit.9 9 As a defense, the United States and its officers argued
that any claims against them were time-barred by the appropriate statute of
limitations, and in the alternative, that they had adversely possessed the land."'o0
The Court was faced with the issue of whether the government could ben-
efit from the expiration of a statutory time period even though it cannot be sued
during that time period.'01 The Court began by stating that the government is
not subject to the defense of a statutory time period when asserting rights of the
public against individuals."°2 The Court suggested that this rule was estab-
lished to prevent public interests or rights from being "prejudiced by the negli-
gence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided ... 103 With
this in mind, the Court held that there was no reason why the government
should not be able to rely on a relevant statute of limitations as a defense when
claims are brought against it in order to protect those same rights for the pub-
lic." ° The Court reasoned that the government is in a unique position to pro-
tect the public interest, which allows it not only to avoid being barred from a
statutory time period when it brings suit, but to also benefit from the same time
period when it is being sued."0 5
Finally, the Court rejected arguments by the plaintiff that the government
should not be able to possess property adversely, unless an exception to sover-
eign immunity was created to allow a suit for recovery of such property.
10 6
95 Stanley, 147 U.S. at 508-10. See also Stanley v. Schwalby, 19 S.W. 264 (Tex. 1892)
(providing a comprehensive overview of the history and facts of the case).
96 Stanley, 147 U.S. at 508-11. The facts, as indicated in the procedural history, state that
while the plaintiff was the first party to receive title, she failed to record title until after the
defendants; however, the Court noted that the defendants took title with notice of the plain-
tiffs claims, did not pay for the property, and thus they were not innocent purchasers. The
Supreme Court did not appear to address the title dispute claims. Id. See also SPRANKLINO,
supra note 23, at 378-91 (explaining rules regarding title disputes including the first in time
rule and the exception to that rule, the subsequent bona fide purchaser doctrine).
97 Stanley, 147 U.S. at 510.
98 Id. at 508-09.
99 Id. at 508 (Initially, only the military officers were sued, but "[t]he United States District
Attorney appeared for the United States, acting, as he alleged, 'by and through instructions
from the Attorney General of the United States'... in the pleas of the other defendants.").
100 Id. at 508-09.
10l Id. at 517.
102 Id. at 514-15.
1o3 Id. at 514.
104 Id. at 517.
105 Id. at 515-18.
106 Id. at 519.
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Addressing this issue, the Court stated: "[i]t by no means follows that because
an action could not be brought in a court of justice, therefore possession might
not be regarded as adverse so as to ripen into title." 10 7 The remedy suggested
by the Court was for the landowner to protest the government's occupancy in
order to destroy the presumption of adverse use or to bring suit against the
agents of the government in their individual capacity. 0 8
Stanley is the first of several decisions that recognize the distinction
between government action and that of government agents who are acting in
their individual capacity.' 0 9 The Court bolsters this distinction by suggesting
that an aggrieved landowner in a similar situation bring a claim against the
government agents who are trespassing on his property, as opposed to bringing
suit against the governmental entity itself.1 O Then the Court stated:
[t]he alleged trespass was committed by the [officers], as the servants of the United
States and by their command, yet if they showed the requisite possession in them-
selves as individuals, though in fact for the United States, under whose authority they
were acting, the defence [sic] [of statute of limitations] was made out. 
111
The problem with the distinction in Stanley is that it allowed the government to
avoid liability for actions by its agents even though they were acting within the
scope of their authority.' 12 This type of reasoning is also troubling because the
Court failed to recognize the inherent difficulty in distinguishing between
actions by the government and those of its agents who are acting in their private
capacity." 3 The ability of a governmental entity to act in a private capacity or
in a governmental capacity is critical and will be addressed later in this
article. 14
Several issues arise when attempting to apply Stanley as authority for the
government to possess privately-held property adversely. First, the Court was
not specifically addressing whether adverse possession was a means for the
federal government to acquire property, but whether sovereign immunity was
applicable to a case of trespass and whether the military officers were seen as
individuals or agents of the United States.' 15 The decision is also inapplicable
107 Id. at 517.
108 Id. at 517-18. See also R.K.G., supra note 11, at 231 (discussing the holding of Stanley
by stating: "the [C]ourt indicated that it is not necessary that the government be amenable to
suit as a prerequisite to taking title by adverse possession. The [C]ourt said, 'protest against
the occupancy and application for redress in the proper quarter would seem to be quite as
potential in destroying the presumption of right to possession ... when the action cannot be
brought, as the action itself when it can.').
109 While Stanley does make the distinction, it does not necessarily rely on the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction that is discussed later in this article. See infra Section IV.C.3. See
also BARLOW II & VONCANNON, supra note 42, at 402 (citing Stanley v. Schwalby for the
authority that: "[t]he United States when holding through its officers and agents who are
subject to action for its recovery may acquire title by adverse possession.").
110 147 U.S. at 517-18.
"'1 Id. at 519.
112 Id.
113 See infra Section IV.C.3 (discussing how municipal corporations have the ability to act
in a dual-status capacity).
"I See infra Section IV.C.3.
"s Stanley, 147 U.S. at 517-19.
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because it fails to address the issue of how takings jurisprudence interacts with
the government's ability to possess privately-held land adversely.
Stanley was decided in the late nineteenth century, which probably
explains the result. During that time, case law in the area of adverse possession
was well established, but takings jurisprudence was not.' 16 It also appears that
the plaintiff pled only trespass and not a taking under the federal or state consti-
tution. 7 If the same facts arose today, the Court would likely reach a different
result and have different theories on which to rest its decision. For example,
the facts in Stanley indicate that the government's use of the plaintiffs land
was sufficient to bring a takings claim. 18 Present-day authority also suggests
that sovereign immunity does not apply when private property rights are in
question. 119 The current state of the law allows a landowner to utilize various
state and federal remedies to sue the government without obtaining consent or
by challenging sovereign immunity for potential takings or tortious trespass
claims.' 2 ° This is most evident through the enactment of the Tucker Act, 12 1
which allows suits against the federal government for potential takings
claims. 122
Stanley makes a bold claim that governmental bodies can adversely pos-
sess private property, but it fails to address the core issue of whether this type
of land acquisition amounts to a taking requiring compensation. The Court's
holding creates a number of inconsistencies that cannot be reconciled without a
more careful analysis.123 It is also troubling that many state courts have relied
on Stanley as authority for the government to possess private property
adversely without questioning the Court's reasoning. 124 The effect of Stanley's
convoluted reasoning has slowly trickled down through the state courts, and its
limited holding has grown into a general rule that governmental entities can
adversely possess private property.' 2 5 Finally, the unpredictability created
within takings jurisprudence also supports the proposition that the Stanley deci-
116 This is not to say that takings law was nonexistent, but to suggest that the bright-line rule
established for determining when a physical taking occurrs was nonexistent during the late
nineteenth century. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982) (establishing the general rule that any physical occupation by the government is a
physical taking).
117 Stanley, 147 U.S. at 508.
i18 Under current law, any physical invasion on private land by a governmental entity is
considered a physical taking. See sources cited supra note 75 and accompanying text.
119 One commonly used remedy is the Tucker Act, which allows jurisdiction for claims
against the federal government, including potential takings claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491
(2000); DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 1231.
120 See sources cited supra note 119.
121 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2000).
122 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 1231.
123 See infra Section IV (discussing the problems that arise when adverse possession is
utilized by governmental entities).
124 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. 1966); State ex rel.
A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985); Johnson v. State, 418
P.2d 509, 510 (Or. 1966).
125 See infra Section IV.B.
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sion, and those relying on it, should be rejected as authority for the government
to possess privately-held property adversely.'
2 6
B. Texaco, Inc. v. Short
A more recent decision often cited as authority for a state to possess pri-
vate property adversely without compensation is Texaco, Inc. v. Short.'2 7
However, the Texaco decision did not involve a governmental entity attempting
to acquire privately-held property through adverse possession; it involved Indi-
ana's Dormant Mineral Act.' 2 8 Under the Act, a mineral interest in property
that was not used for at least twenty years would automatically lapse and there-
fore revert to the current surface owner of the property. 129 To prevent the
reversion, the Act requires an owner to file a statement of intent to retain the
interest with the county recorder.13 °
Several parties who lost their mineral interest by failing to meet the Act's
requirements brought suit and claimed that the application of the statute
resulted in a taking of property without just compensation.13 ' Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, declared that the states define property rights, not the
Constitution, and therefore a "[s]tate has the power to condition the permanent
retention of that property right on the performance of reasonable conditions that
indicate a present intention to retain the interest." 132  He reaffirmed that
"[s]tates have the power to permit unused or abandoned interest in property to
revert to another after the passage of time." '13 3 These laws really amount to a
"withdrawal of a remedy rather than a destruction of a right."' 3 4 Because the
slight burden on the owner to use his interest or file a written statement is so
minute, the Court declared that "[i]t is the owner's failure to make any use of
the property - and not the action of the State - that causes the lapse of the
property right. ,,.." Finally, Justice Stevens emphasized that "this Court has
never required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his
own neglect."' 3 6 Therefore, because the former owners had abandoned their
126 See infra Section IV.
127 454 U.S. 516 (1982). The Texaco decision has been frequently cited as authority for a
governmental entity to possess privately-held property adversely. See, e.g., Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Saguache v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 983 (Colo. 1984); A.A.A. Invs., 478
N.E.2d at 775; Reitsma v. Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC, 774 A.2d 826, 838 (R.I. 2001).
But see Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224 (D.R.I.
2002) (rejecting Texaco as authority for states to possess property adversely without just
compensation); Selemba, supra note 3, at 673 (rejecting Texaco as authority for States to use
adverse possession because it fails to encompass the concept of adverse possession).
128 IND. CODE § 32-5-11-1 (1982) repealed by IND. CODE § 32-23-10-2 (2004); Texaco, 454
U.S. at 518.
129 Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518.
130 Id.
131 Id. at 522.
132 Id. at 526.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 528.
135 Id. at 530.
136 Id.
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interest in the mineral rights, there was no "taking" that required
compensation. 117
The Texaco decision is important for several reasons. It recognizes that
property rights can be extinguished by state action if a landowner negligently
fails to enforce his rights.' 38 The key ingredient in the Texaco decision is the
form of "state action."' 3 9 The Texaco Court recognized that the State of Indi-
ana merely created a law that had the possibility of divesting mineral rights
from one party and transferring them to the original landowner. Therefore, the
State was not actually acquiring any rights through any affirmative actions of
its own but merely establishing a time period during which rights can be
extinguished.
However, when courts use Texaco as authority for states to possess private
property adversely, several problems arise. First, these decisions fail to recog-
nize that any time a government actor enters land or creates a regulation affect-
ing privately-held property, he is subject to constitutional constraints - namely
the Takings Clause. 4 ' Second, courts fail to recognize that the statute in Tex-
aco merely allowed rights to be transferred from one party to the original land-
owner.' 4 1 The State did not acquire any rights through this transfer but merely
allowed the right of reversion to take place.14 2 Finally, in Texaco, the State did
not enter private land without permission or cause the rights to be divested
from the holder by prescriptive means. Therefore, using Texaco as authority
for a governmental entity to possess private property adversely is inconsistent
with the entire scheme of takings jurisprudence.
A more workable proposition under current takings law and the Texaco
decision is the notion that any time a governmental entity enters privately-held
land or creates a burdensome land-use regulation, it is subject to a takings claim
by the property owner.'4 3 If the potential claim is not enforced through an
appropriate inverse condemnation proceeding within the appropriate time
period, the Texaco decision suggests that the right to pursue that claim can be
extinguished like any other legal claim.' The notion that a takings claim can
be extinguished through the running of a statute of limitations is consistent with
other authorities. 1
4 5
The Texaco decision is the most recent Supreme Court holding that has
been relied on as a state's authority to possess private property adversely.' 4 6
While it does not embody the concept of adverse possession, it does stand for
137 Id.
138 Id. at 525-30.
139 See Foncello, supra note 11, at 679-80 ("In Texaco, the state is not a trespasser. The
often-neglected language in Texaco is that the transfer of the property right under the Min-
eral Lapse Act is not due to an 'action of the State.'").
140 Contra Selemba, supra note 3, at 674-77 (erroneously suggesting that a taking only
occurs after the adverse possession statute of limitations runs and failing to recognize that
any time a governmental entity enters land a potential takings claim arises).
141 Texaco, 454 U.S. at 518.
142 Id.
143 See supra Section I.B.1.
"" Texaco, 454 U.S. at 528-30.
145 See sources cited supra note 85 and accompanying text.
146 See State ex rel. A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985).
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the authority that property rights can be divested from an owner who has failed
to take precautionary measures to protect his rights.
147
IV. A CATEGORICAL RESPONSE FOR CHANGE: How STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS APPLY ADVERSE POSSESSION WHEN RAISED BY A
GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY
Over the past one hundred years, courts have struggled to find a uniform
application of adverse possession when utilized by a governmental entity.
1 48
Surveying the case law from all fifty states could lead to complete confusion
and quick frustration. This section argues that the use of takings jurisprudence
is better suited to handle property disputes involving a governmental entity and
is superior to relying on ill-reasoned adverse possession decisions. This section
also provides a historical analysis of how the use of adverse possession by
governmental entities evolved from mere inconsistencies in case law into the
established rule that many states follow today. Finally, this section will
describe how adverse possession has been applied over the past century and
will group the applications into uniform categories to show the inconsistencies
and poor reasoning produced by these decisions.
149
A. The Basic Proposal for Change
The use of adverse possession should not be applied in favor of the gov-
ernmental entity when well-settled takings jurisprudence would obtain a similar
result for the government and more favorable rulings for private landowners. 150
The rationales for adverse possession are nearly identical to those used for
traditional statutes of limitation, including those used for inverse condemnation
claims. 15 1 In either instance, at the expiration of the statutory time period for
adverse possession or an inverse condemnation claim, the government will hold
147 See Selemba, supra note 3, at 673 (arguing that Texaco has been inaccurately applied as
authority to adversely possess private property because it was not addressing the use of
adverse possession by a governmental entity).
148 See infra Section IV.B.
149 In preparing this article, the author surveyed over one hundred cases involving the use of
adverse possession by governmental entities and grouped the decisions by the date of the
decision, factual distinctions, how adverse possession was applied in favor of the govern-
ment and the type of legal authority, if any, relied upon for the use of adverse possession by
the government. A majority of the case law reviewed by the author was found within two
articles. See generally Selemba, supra note 3 (discussing recent developments in the area of
adverse possession by governmental entities); Vann, supra note 7, at 686 (providing a fifty
state listing of decisions involving governmental adverse possession).
150 The first category, Section IV.C.1, is the only occasion in this Article where adverse
possession is appropriately applied due to the fact that it is not being applied in favor of a
governmental entity but on behalf of the public who acquired the rights in the first place.
151 Compare HERBERT HOVENKAMP & SHELDON F. KURTZ, PRINCIPLES OF PROPERTY LAW
57 (6th ed. 2005) ("The purposes of such statutes of limitation [for adverse possession] are to
suppress dormant claims, to quiet titles, to require diligence on the part of the owner and
penalize those who sit on their rights too long, and to reward the economic activities of a
possessor who is utilizing land more efficiently than the true owner is."), with I CALVIN W.
CORMAN, LIMITATION OF ACTIONS 11-17 (1991) (stating that the purpose of statutes of limi-
tation are to eliminate stale claims, penalize those who sit on rights, and reward those who
pursue their claims).
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an interest in the property.' 52 For example, under takings law, if a governmen-
tal entity entered private property without permission and the requisite takings
elements were satisfied, it would be subject to a potential inverse condemnation
claim.153 However, if the landowner fails to pursue the claim within the statu-
tory time period, the claim would be time-barred and the government would
have acquired an interest in the property by default, which would avoid the
need for adverse possession.' 54 Some critics argue that adverse possession is
necessary to transfer title to the government,' 55 but this is not entirely true.'5 6
A party who successfully adversely possesses property only obtains an interest
in the property and must perfect that interest to obtain "marketable title"' 57 by
bringing a successful quiet title58 action.' 59 The same is true if the govern-
ment obtains an interest in the property after the landowner fails to bring an
inverse condemnation claim within the requisite time period. 160 Thus, when all
factors are taken into account, the use of adverse possession is not required for
a valid transfer of title. More importantly, the use of takings law would be
consistent with procedures established under the Fifth Amendment by allowing
non-negligent landowners the opportunity to file an inverse claim during the
time when the government has misappropriated their land.
Takings law is also more predictable and a more developed area of law
capable of resolving more disputes when compared to governmental adverse
possession.' 6 ' Having predictable procedures in place would benefit landown-
ers attempting to enforce takings claims by eliminating the need to litigate the
defense of adverse possession on behalf of the government. 162 What many
152 The governmental entity will hold an interest in the property, but in either case, a quiet
title action is probably necessary in order to obtain marketable title. See infra Section
IV.C.2.
153 The requisite elements of a takings claim are mentioned above. See supra Section
II.B.2.
154 See POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79E.03[2] (Michael A. Wolf ed., 2005) (suggesting
that once the statute of limitations expires for an inverse condemnation claim, no claim for
compensation exists).
155 Foncello, supra note 11, at 687-88 (arguing that the use of adverse possession by gov-
ernmental entities is necessary to quiet title, but nevertheless compensation must be granted).
156 In fact, adverse possession only quiets title in a limited number of circumstances. Pow-
ELL, supra note 154, at § 81.03[6][d]. In most cases, a party who obtains title by adverse
possession or who receives title from an adverse possessor must bring a quiet title action in
court to obtain marketable title. Id. Title may also be marketable if the jurisdiction has
adopted the Marketable Record Title Act and any potential claims exceed a specific number
of years after the root of title. See THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 91.09(b)(1) (David A.
Thomas ed., 1994).
157 Title is marketable if "a reasonable person - knowing the facts about seller's title includ-
ing its chain of title, encumbrances against it and any opposing claims of ownership - would
accept the title without hesitation ...." POWELL, supra note 154, at § 81.03[6][a].
158 A quiet title suit is an action brought in a court of law to resolve a title dispute for a
piece of real property. See POWELL, supra note 154, at § 81.03[6][d][ii].
159 See supra notes 154 and 156.
160 See supra note 154.
161 See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
162 The government has a number of procedural defenses that can be utilized against takings
claims and adding adverse possession to the list only complicates things. See generally
ZIZ.A ET AL., supra note 78 (providing a comprehensive guide to avoiding takings claims
specifically designed for state and municipal governments).
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courts fail to recognize is that determining when a takings claim has accrued
can be difficult, even when adverse possession does not come into play. 163
However, case law makes apparent that when adverse possession is added to
the mix, litigants and courts spend even more time struggling with procedural
issues concerning when a taking accrues or if a claim is present at all.'6 When
the astronomical cost of litigating a takings claim is factored into this equation,
removing the adverse possession hurdle appears to be a logical solution in favor
of landowners when it could mean the difference in bringing a successful claim
or having their claim dismissed and sent through an endless appellate
process. 165
Takings law would also prevent the government from claiming that it did
not cause the taking because it was acting in a private capacity. 166 This propo-
sal would assume that any time a government body enters land without permis-
sion or creates a burdensome regulation, it is acting in a public capacity;
therefore, a potential takings claim would accrue, and the appropriate time
period would apply to bring an inverse condemnation claim. 167 The rein-
troduction of traditional takings law would reduce the inconsistencies that have
resulted from the introduction of adverse possession into this area of law. 168
Preventing the government from utilizing adverse possession would be consis-
tent with the property rights movement while also encouraging proper condem-
nation procedures on behalf of the government. 169 Finally, relying on takings
law would dismiss arguments by landowners who often claim that the govern-
ment gets the best of either situation when adverse possession is asserted.
Their argument is a rational one, recognizing that that most property held by
the government is not subject to adverse possession, so why should the govern-
ment be able to possess private property adversely? 170
163 See id. at § 10.7; infra note 165.
164 See cases cited supra note 20.
165 The scales of justice are unfairly tipped in favor of the government when citizens
are faced with the threat of losing their property due to regulatory burdens. Not only
are the laws drafted to ease the litigation burden of the government, but the costs of
takings litigation can range in the hundreds or thousands of dollars - too high for the
average citizen to bear. Consequently, many citizens, when faced with a government
takings claim, cannot pursue their rights under the Fifth Amendment. The govern-
ment, on the other hand, does not face a similar shortage of resources (at least in
comparison to the individual property owner) and can often pursue a vigorous
defense of the case without constraint. Adding to the hardship, procedural hurdles
often bar litigation on the merits of takings claims for anywhere from five to ten
years.
NANCIE G. MARZULLA & ROGER J. MARZULLA, PROPERTY RIGHTS: UNDERSTANDING Gov-
ERNMENT TAKING AND ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 143 (1997).
166 See infra Section IV.C.3.
167 Id.
168 See sources cited supra note 20.
169 "States have been very active in the pursuit of legislative solutions to the taking of
property rights." MARZULLA & MARZULLA, supra note 165, at 171. Some call it the "The
Property Rights' Revolt." Id. at 173.
170 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 162.
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B. The Use of Adverse Possession by Governmental Entities Has Evolved
in Questionable Ways
In the late nineteenth century, courts were quick to apply theories of pre-
scription and adverse possession in favor of the government without justifica-
tion or meaningful analysis of how the doctrine interacted with takings law. 7 1
This type of analysis began the Implied Justification172 period because courts
were impliedly justifying the use of adverse possession by governmental enti-
ties without any analysis or explanation. A prime example of the Implied Justi-
fication analysis is the Stanley decision discussed earlier in this article.17 3
Decisions under this category of Implied Justification are most likely the result
of difficult factual situations where "hard cases make bad law."' 17 4 As with
many of the decisions applying adverse possession in favor of a state entity, the
courts appear to be struggling to find an equitable solution in favor of the gov-
ernment when legal theories would lead to unjust results. 175
Implied justification has also been used in recent decisions involving
municipal corporations.176 Courts using this analysis have granted municipali-
ties the ability to use adverse possession either without citing authority at all, or
based on the notion that there is no authority preventing them from using the
doctrine in favor of the government. 177 One Florida court illustrated this type
of application when it held that the government's ability to use adverse posses-
sion was so well established that it was "unnecessary to burden th[e] opinion
with any discussion of that proposition." 178 The lack of case law leading up to
the 1950s probably explains why courts struggled to find authority for govern-
mental adverse possession and were left to rely on the myth that an adverse
possession analysis could be used without affecting the takings doctrine. 7 9
Nevertheless, this type of reasoning can leave practitioners bumbling to find
any justification within this area of law or any consistent application thereof.
As case law has developed, the Express Justification 8 ' period began a
new line of decision making where courts expressly set precedent that allowed
171 See, e.g., Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508, 517 (1893); Quindaro Twp. v. Squier, 51
F. 152 (8th Cir. 1892); Collett v. Bd. Comm'rs, 21 N.E. 329 (Ind. 1889); Stephens v. Mur-
ray, 34 S.W. 56, 57 (Mo. 1896). See also supra Section III.A.
172 This term is the author's creation.
173 See supra Section III.A.
171 See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 400-01 (1904) (Holmes, J., dis-
senting) ("[H]ard cases make bad law" is a quote often used in situations where the court
fails to find an appropriate solution.). See also infra Section IV.C.4 (discussing the equitable
application of adverse possession in favor of a governmental entity).
175 See infra Section IV.C.4.
176 See, e.g., United States v. Stubbs, 776 F.2d 1472, 1475 (10th Cir. 1985); United States v.
McCulley, 100 F. Supp. 379 (E.D. Tenn. 1951); Drainage Dist. #1 v. Village of Green Val-
ley, 387 N.E.2d 422, 426 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979). See also Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd. v. Ruston
Coll., 162 So. 2d 419, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1964) ("There is no prohibition in the organic law
prohibiting the running of prescription in favor of the state .....
177 See id.
178 See Levering v. City of Tarpon Springs, 92 So. 2d 638, 639 (Fla. 1957).
179 R.K.G., supra note 11, at 231 (noting that even during the 1950s there was "a surprising
lack of cases on this precise point .... ").
18o This term is the author's creation.
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states to utilize adverse possession as a means of obtaining private property. 18 1
A majority of these decisions relied upon real property treatises,182 legal ency-
clopedias 18 3 and case law 184 that were not exactly on point.1 85 For example, a
number of courts were quick to cite legal encyclopedias as authority to allow
any state entity to possess private property adversely, but they failed to recog-
nize the applications cited within the encyclopedia articles were either inaccu-
rate or limited in their holdings. 186 This misplaced reliance is most evident in
early decisions that allowed municipal corporations to utilize adverse posses-
sion. 187 These early decisions were limited in their holdings to the special sta-
tus of municipal corporations, 188 but other courts used these decisions to apply
adverse possession in a myriad of non-municipal scenarios. The primary result
of this misapplication resulted in the fundamental misunderstanding of how
adverse possession relates to the takings doctrine and how it should be applied
to governmental entities, whether a municipal corporation or not.' 8 9 The ques-
tionable evolution of authorities suggesting that governmental entities can
adversely possess private property is yet another reason to rely on takings law.
C. Areas of Application Suggest a Need for Change
Within the vast line of cases allowing adverse possession to be used in
favor of a governmental body, there are several major areas in which it has
been applied with some uniformity.' 90 The author has attempted to categorize
the case law in an effort to make a uniform response. These areas can be
divided into several groups: (1) state's ability to acquire roadways on behalf of
the public; (2) applying an adverse possession statute of limitation to limit
inverse condemnation claims; (3) allowing municipal corporations to acquire
181 See, e.g., Hollywood, Inc. v. Zinkil, 403 So. 2d 528, 535 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Miner v. Yantis, 102 N.E.2d 524, 526 (Ill. 1951); State ex rel. A.A.A. Invs. v. City of
Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985); Johnson v. State, 418 P.2d 509, 510 (Or.
1966).
182 See, e.g., Johnson, 418 P.2d at 510 (relying on various treatises including TiFFANY,
REAL PROPERTY 4 (3d ed. 1939), for the rule that a state can acquire property by adverse
possession, but the treatise relies on the confused theories of Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S.
508 (1893)).
183 See, e.g., Miner, 102 N.E.2d at 526 (citing 1 Am. JUR 801, which states: "[t]itle of this
nature may be acquired [through adverse possession] by the Crown, the United States, states,
municipal corporations, and other governmental entities." Nonetheless, a closer look at the
case law cited by the encyclopedia includes Attorney Gen. ex rel. Bd. of Harbor and Land
Comm'rs v. Ellis, 84 N.E. 430 (Mass. 1908), which involves the public acquiring fights
through adverse possession and not a governmental entity. The article also cites City of
Raleigh v. Durfey, 79 S.E. 434 (N.C. 1913), which deals specifically with municipal corpo-
rations and does not grant authority to all governmental bodies.).
184 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Stephens, 407 S.W.2d 711, 712 (Ky. 1966) (relying on
Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893) as authority for the United States to adversely
possess private property without considering its confused analysis).
185 See cases cited supra note 176.
186 Id.
187 See Wyalusing Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Babcock, 11 Pa. D. & C. 536, 540 (Ct. Com. P1.
1928).
188 See id.
189 See supra Section IV.
190 See supra note 149.
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property through adverse possession; (4) use of adverse possession to cure
defective condemnation or title disputes.
1. State's Ability to Acquire Roadways on Behalf of the Public
The first category involves a state's ability to acquire private land on
behalf of the public for rights-of-way that were established exclusively by the
public. 19 ' These decisions can be quickly dismissed as authority for a govern-
mental entity to possess privately-held property adversely or as means of skirt-
ing the Just Compensation Clause. Therefore, this category is not in need of
reform according to the author's proposal; nevertheless, it is an important topic
worthy of discussion because these decisions are often cited as authority for the
government to use adverse possession.' 92
While these decisions are often confusing at first blush because the State
appears to claim title to the land through adverse or prescriptive use, this is not
the case. 193 In most of these situations, the general public has established the
right-of-way by using private land adversely for the requisite period and the
"appropriate corporate governmental unit ... holds title for the benefit of the
public."' 194 The primary argument raised by the government, and rightfully so,
191 See COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-2-201 (2004) (public highways can be established by
adverse use for twenty consecutive years); Zakutansky v. Kanzler, 634 N.E.2d 75 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1994); Dunnick v. Stockgrowers Bank of Marmouth, 215 N.W.2d 93 (Neb. 1974);
David G. Thatcher, Tenth Circuit Survey: Real Properly Survey, 71 DENY. U. L. REV. 1041,
1057-59 (1994) (discussing the application of Colorado statutory law that allows the public
to adversely possess roads over private property). See also Lori Potter et al., Legal Under-
pinnings of the Right to Float Through Private Property in Colorado: A Reply to John Hill,
51 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 457, 496-98 (2002) (noting that some states have "treated
rivers as public highways or as subject to adverse possession by public use" under prescrip-
tion statutes). See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18 (2000)
(providing a list of state statutes that allow the public to acquire public roadways by
prescription).
192 See James M. Kehoe, The Next Wave in Public Beach Access: Removal of States as
Trustees of Public Trust Properties, 63 FORDHAm L. REV. 1913, 1949-50 (1995) (misunder-
standing the distinction between the public acquiring prescriptive rights that are held by the
state and when the state itself actually attempts to acquire rights by prescription); Stewart E.
Sterk, Publicly Held Servitudes in the New Restatement, 27 CONN. L. REV. 157, 158-59
(1994) (recognizing that the Restatement drafters were uncertain as to the consequences of
the public acquiring prescriptive rights compared to the government actually acquiring the
rights). See also Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 99-100 (arguing that a taking occurs
when the public acquires prescriptive rights over privately-held land because the public in
general obtains the benefit of the prescriptive rights).
193 See sources cited supra notes 124 and 127.
I" See Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d at 96; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.18
cmt. b (2000) ("Use and control rights are not ordinarily separated in servitudes held for
private benefit, but they are necessarily separate when the servitude is created to benefit the
public at large. The control rights must be located in an entity capable of exercising them.
Under the rule stated in this section .... control rights are lodged in the state."). See also
Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 98-99 ("Many courts have realized that the grant of a
prescription to the public is a difficult idea .... When granted, who exactly receives the
right? Some courts have held that municipalities may hold prescriptive rights. Other courts
have awarded prescriptive easements to the public, which appears to be the modern legal
trend.") (citations omitted); Sterk, supra note 192, at 157 ("[I]t would be impossible to cre-
ate servitudes for public benefit if each citizen were required to be a party to all transactions
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is that it has not acquired title to the land, but that the general public has
acquired the land like any other private citizen.195 To be more direct, members
of the public, not the state or an agent of the state, have either intentionally or
unintentionally used private land as a public roadway on their own and without
influence from the state.196 As it is well known, the general public does not
have the ability to use eminent domain and is not subject to constitutional limi-
tations, namely the Takings Clause.' 9 7
However, many questions have been raised about the government's ability
to hold title for the public, although most authorities hold that once the land has
been dedicated as a "public way by prescription, then the City cannot use the
public way for any purpose foreign to the public way."'1 98 Limiting a state's
ability to transform the land into another use prevents claims alleging that the
government has acquired title in fee, not the general public. It is also important
to realize that the general public usually does not acquire title in fee like an
individual but generally obtains a perpetual easement.1 99 The only state action
in these cases is that of the government representing the general public to offi-
cially establish the prescriptive rights. Thus, the governmental act did not
cause the property rights to be taken for constitutional purposes. Similarly, if a
state creates a statute that allows the public to acquire prescriptive rights, it
should not trigger state liability for a taking. The enactment of legislation that
allows the public to acquire property by prescriptive means is no different than
enacting a statute for adverse possession to be used by private individuals. In
either case, the actions of private individuals, and not the state, have caused
property rights to be lost. On its face, neither the government's representation
of the public nor the enactment of the statute would be sufficient to trigger a
takings claim.
Several courts have addressed the issue of whether a state statute that
allows the public to acquire rights-of-way by adverse possession is a taking
requiring just compensation. 2 1 One court relied on Texaco, Inc. v. Short20
and held that states have the ability to "condition the ownership of an interest in
property upon compliance with conditions that impose such a slight burden on
the owner. '20 2 The slight burden mentioned by the Court required the owner to
creating such servitudes. Governmental bodies, therefore, represent the public in negotia-
tions to create servitudes for public benefit.").
195 See Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d at 96; GRANT S. NELSON ET AL., CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY
736 (1996) ("[T]o establish the requisite public prescriptive easement, the public must show
that the use and enjoyment of the land was exclusive, adverse, continuous, uninterrupted,
open and notorious, and under a claim of right for the full prescriptive period.") (emphasis
added) (quoting Leu v. Littell, 513 N.W.2d 24, 32 (Neb. Ct.App. 1993).
196 See NELSON, supra note 195, at 736.
197 See Dunnick, 215 N.W.2d at 96.
198 See City of Ft. Smith v. Mikel, 335 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Ark. 1960). See also RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.17 (2000) (prescriptive rights only allow the
holder to use the land for the established use).
199 See Hollywood, Inc. v. Zinkil, 403 So. 2d 528, 540 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
200 See Gotland v. Town of Cave Creek, 837 P.2d 1132 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1991); Bd. of
County Comm'rs of Saguache v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975, 983 (Colo. 1984).
201 454 U.S. 516 (1982). See also supra Section III.B (discussing the relevance of the
Texaco decision to this issue).
202 Flickinger, 687 P.2d at 984.
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object to the public's use of his land prior to the running of the statute of
limitations, but the owner failed to do so, which caused the owner to lose all
rights in the property.2 °3 Another court followed a similar analysis and held
that any rights that existed in the property were lost after the statute of limita-
tions had run, and "[o]nce lost or extinguished, the owner's 'rights' cannot be
'taken'; therefore no compensation is required. ' 2°
The problem with these decisions is that they assume that the government
is establishing the prescriptive rights, although this is not the case. As previ-
ously mentioned, the general public, not the state, has met the prescription
requirements; thus any claim that a taking occurred should be rejected. This
category is not subject to the proposal set forth earlier in this article.
2. Applying an Adverse Possession Statute of Limitation to Limit
Inverse Condemnation Claims
Over the past five years, the primary source of controversy within this area
of law surrounds the Pascoag20 5 decisions and the issue of whether a govern-
mental body, in its official capacity,2 0 6 can adversely possess privately-held
property. These decisions struggle with the uncertainty of when a taking has
"accrued," thus triggering the time period to file an inverse condemnation
claim.2" 7 Courts addressing this issue have been split between two different
applications, both of which are illustrated in Figure 12°8 The first line of deci-
sions follows the Takings Analysis, 20 9 as the courts under this theory are essen-
tially following traditional takings jurisprudence, but with a twist of adverse
possession. 21 0 On the other hand, there is a second line of decisions that fol-
lows the Adverse Possession Analysis, 211 due to the application of substan-
tive2 12 adverse possession in favor of the governmental entity.21 3 The
difference between the two applications can have harsh ramifications for a
property owner attempting to establish when a taking has accrued. So the criti-
203 Id.
204 Gotland, 837 P.2d at 1136.
205 See cases cited supra note 2.
206 These decisions are not questioning whether or not the governmental entity was acting in
a governmental capacity or whether it was acting within a private capacity, the distinction is
mentioned in this article. See infra Section IV.C.3.
207 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
208 See cases cited supra note 20.
209 This term is the author's creation and refers to cases where traditional takings law is
applied, so that a potential taking claim accrues once a government official enters a private
citizen's property or creates a burdensome regulation.
210 See cases cited infra note 214.
21 1 This term is also the author's creation, referring to cases where a takings claim accrues
once the government has acquired title to land through adverse possession.
212 The author is referring to the application of adverse possession where courts actually
apply the elements of a prima facie case, as opposed to applying the adverse possession
statute of limitations to limit the time period to file an inverse condemnation claim. See
infra Section IV.C.3.
213 See Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 337 F.3d 87, 96 (lst Cir. 2003);
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224 (D.R.I. 2002);
Johnson v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1985).
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cal question remains: which application makes the most sense based on reason-
able interpretations of adverse possession and takings law?
FIGURE 1. COMPARISON BETWEEN THE TAKINGS ANALYSIS AND THE
ADVERSE POSSESSION ANALYSIS
I
GOVERNMENTs~ 2 4
ENrTs LAND STATUTORY STATUTORY
WmHOUTr TrIE PERIOD TIMEF PERIOD
PERMISSION THAT IS 3 THAT IS 5
OR CREATES A RUNNING R.esuiT of RrN-NING RESULT OF
BURDENSOME DURING THIS TIME PERIOD DRIrNG THIS TiM PERIoD
RGULAATION TIM PERIoD EXPIRiNG TuIF PERIOD ExPUN.o
Takings Takings Claim Inverse Land owner None None
Analysis Accrues Condemnation can no longer
challenge the
taking
Adverse No Takings Adverse Government Inverse Land owner
Possession Claim Possession acquires an Condemnation can no longer
Analysis Accrues interest in the challenge the
property and a Taking
Takings Claim
Accrues
The Takings Analysis is the most consistent and logical application
according to current takings law. Under the Takings Analysis, courts essen-
tially follow the Texaco rationale by stating that once private property has been
adversely possessed, no taking can occur because the state actually owns title to
the property at that point.2 14 At first glance, the Takings Analysis appears to
allow the government to utilize substantive adverse possession,215 but this is
not the case, as several courts expressly note that the landowner has the option
of filing for inverse condemnation during the adverse possession statutory
period.2 16 The courts are assuming that any time a governmental body enters
privately-held land or creates a burdensome regulation, a possible takings claim
arises. For example, in Weidner v. Department of Transportation & Public
Facilities,2 17 the court held that during the government's adverse use, the land-
owner is required to bring an inverse condemnation claim, and if he fails to do
214 See Weidner v. Dep't of Transp. & Pub. Facilities, 860 P.2d 1205, 1212 (Alaska 1993);
State ex rel. A.A.A. Invs. v. City of Columbus, 478 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ohio 1985).
215 As one author erroneously stated:
[T]he owner of the land may not claim a constitutional right against the government after the
adverse use reaches prescription. This leads to a constitutional right of inverse condemnation
being quashed by common law. The denial of a constitutional right by the workings of a rule
based in common law is in direct violation of rudimentary public policy.
Ackerman & Johnson, supra note 6, at 100 (citations omitted).
216 See, e.g., Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1212 ("The theory of prescriptive easement does not
grant the State affirmative authority to take property without just compensation. Rather, the
prescriptive period - as with any statute of limitations - requires a private landowner to
bring an inverse condemnation action for public use of private property within a specified
period of time. At the expiration of the prescriptive period, the landowner's right to bring
suit is extinguished, effectively vesting property rights in the adverse user.") (citations
omitted).
217 860 P.2d 1205 (Alaska 1993).
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so, his claim is time-barred.218 In actuality, whether recognized by the courts
or not, courts are applying an adverse or prescriptive statute of limitations to
limit the time period in which an inverse condemnation claim can be filed when
no express statutory period exists. 2 ' 9 Applying an adverse possession statutory
period to limit an inverse condemnation claim appears to be nothing new in the
realm of civil procedure.22 ° In fact, litigants for some time have attempted to
argue that constitutional claims cannot be extinguished by statutes of limita-
tions, but these arguments have been quickly rejected as public policy favors
the expedition of claims.2 2'
The Takings Analysis also achieves the same result that is sought after by
the use of substantive adverse possession. Courts and legal scholars alike
appear to prefer the use of the Adverse Possession analysis over the use of the
Takings Analysis because it allows the government to acquire title to the prop-
erty once it has been successfully adversely possessed.22 2 However, once prop-
erty is adversely possessed, the successful party only holds an interest in the
property that must be perfected by a quiet title action in order for it to be
marketable and transferable. 223 The same is true if the government acquires an
interest in property by a landowner's failure to bring an inverse condemnation
claim within the statutory time period. In either case, in order to have marketa-
ble title, the government would be required to bring a quiet title action to per-
fect its interest. Therefore, the use of adverse possession is not a necessary
element for the government to perfect an interest in property.
Conversely, the Adverse Possession Analysis is more troubling and incon-
sistent with current takings law. Using the Adverse Possession Analysis, sev-
eral courts assert that the government has the ability to use adverse possession,
which allows it to utilize the privately-held property during the statutory
period.224 These courts hold that the government only obtains an interest in the
land after it has exceeded the adverse possession statutory period, thus acquir-
ing title.225 Following this reasoning, the courts claim that a taking only
218 Id. at 1212.
219 See La Cholla Curtis Ltd. P'ship v. Pima County, No. 93-16186, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
15104, at *6 (9th Cir. June 16, 1995); Weidner, 860 P.2d at 1212. See also Wadsworth v.
Dep't of Transp., 915 P.2d 1, 4 (Idaho 1996) (discussing how inverse condemnation claims
can be limited by using the statute of limitations for prescription).
220 See generally Marvel, supra note 84 (providing a overview of how different states limit
the time period to file an inverse condemnation claim, if no statutory period exists, and
recognizing that often the time period for adverse possession is used if no period exists); 27
AM. JUR. 2 D Eminent Domain § 795 (2004) (when no time period exists to bring an action to
recover property from a governmental body who has failed to use proper condemnation
proceedings, no time period short of the time period provided for by adverse possession
should be utilized).
221 See sources cited supra note 85.
222 See Foncello, supra note 11, at 687-88 (arguing that the use of adverse possession by
governmental entities is necessary to quiet title, but nevertheless compensation must be
granted). See also infra Section IV.C.4.
223 See sources cited supra note 156 and accompanying text.
224 See cases cited supra note 213.
225 Id.
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accrues after the adverse possession statutory period runs.22 6 For example, in
Pascoag Reservoir & Dam v. Rhode Island,22 7 the court held that a takings
claim only accrues after the government has successfully adversely possessed
the property, and no claim exists while it utilizes the property during the statu-
tory period.22 8 Under this application, the courts not only assume that a gov-
ernmental body can use substantive adverse possession, but they also claim that
governmental bodies are not subject to a takings claim until they have obtained
title through adverse possession.2 29
The Adverse Possession Analysis is flawed for several reasons. First, for
the government to be able to possess land adversely without being subject to a
potential takings claim, courts must assume that the government is acting in a
non-governmental capacity a3° or that it is not subject to any relevant just com-
pensation clauses while using the private property. 23  Both of these implica-
tions can easily be rejected. The notion that a governmental body can act in a
private or non-governmental capacity has been criticized by many scholars due
to its inherent complications and is thoroughly discussed in Section IV.C.3 of
this Article. It is also common legal knowledge that any governmental body
acting in a governmental capacity is subject to state or federal constitutional
provisions.
The Adverse Possession decisions also assume that a governmental entity
is only subject to a potential takings claim after it has acquired title through
232 ti
adverse possession. Under this reasoning, the court implies that the entity is
acting in a governmental capacity when it acquires title, which makes it subject
to a potential takings claim. This change in identity upon acquiring title is
puzzling to say the least. These courts are essentially holding that once the
governmental actor enters land or creates a burdensome regulation, it is not
acting in its official governmental capacity subject to constitutional provisions,
but once title is acquired, it is acting as a governmental body subject to consti-
tutional constraints. The only assumption that can be made is that the govern-
ment is presumed to be a private trespasser during this time. By accepting this
reasoning, the courts are allowing the government to have it both ways by using
smoke and mirrors to avoid constitutional limitations that were enacted to pre-
vent such inconsistent and overreaching results.2 33 At the very least, the land-
owner should be able to claim a temporary taking when the government is
loitering on its property.23 4
226 Id. See also Selemba, supra note 3, at 676 (arguing in support of the decisions that
suggest a taking only accrues after the adverse possession statute of limitations has run).
227 217 F. Supp. 2d 206 (D.R.I. 2002).
221 Id. at 224.
229 See cases cited supra note 2.
230 See infra Section IV.C.3.
231 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V; CoLo. CONST. art. II, § 15 (providing an example of a
typical state just compensation clause).
232 See, e.g., Pascoag Reservoir & Dam, LLC v. Rhode Island, 217 F. Supp. 2d 206, 224
(D.R.I. 2002) ("A plaintiff could not bring a takings claim until the possession or prescrip-
tion period had been completed because, until that time, the government had not taken a
property interest.").
233 See supra Section II.B.I.
234 SACKMAN, supra note 77, § 6.01116].
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Similarly, from a landowner's perspective, the Adverse Possession deci-
sions are confusing and raise pleading complications for landowners seeking
recourse against a governmental entity or its agent entering privately-held prop-
erty without permission. The problem is determining in what capacity the
entity is acting in order to determine who should be sued and what claims
should be brought.2 35 If the landowner assumes that the parties are acting in a
governmental capacity, a takings or tortious trespass claim would be appropri-
ate. On the other hand, if landowner assumes that they are acting in a private
capacity, a suit against the individual actors for trespass and ejectment would
be appropriate. Determining which party is liable and the claims to bring can
be complex. The process may lead to unnecessary amendments to pleadings,
may cause a huge waste of time, and can cause a plaintiff to incur unnecessary
legal fees.2 36 This could also cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline based
on the running of a statute of limitations or lead to constant dismissals, while
the government uses its dual status to avoid constitutional liability. These pro-
cedural issues are not merely hypothetical; a survey of federal and state court
decisions illustrate how private landowners suffer harsh penalties when govern-
mental entities hide under the cloak of their dual status.23 7
The theory of adverse possession is also perceived by the general public as
a dishonest way to obtain title to property.2 38 Property rights advocates argue
that mistakes by landowners or negligence on their part should never transfer
property rights to a wrongdoer who never paid valuable consideration for such
an interest.239 Legal scholars have also raised the question: "[g]iven that a
private party may not be able to get government property by adverse posses-
sion, is it fair that the government is nevertheless able to get private property by
adverse possession? '240 At least to the public, it would appear that there is a
double standard in which government property is given special protection,
while an all-powerful governmental entity has the right to acquire wrongly pri-
vate property.
The reasoning behind the Adverse Possession Analysis is inconsistent
with current takings law and should be rejected. On the other hand, the Tak-
ings Analysis, after being untangled, appears to be consistent with modern tak-
ings law and the more logical approach. This application assumes that when a
governmental body enters land or creates a regulation, it is subject to a potential
takings claim, while impliedly rejecting the use of adverse possession by a
governmental body. However, the concept needs to be clarified within the judi-
ciary by expressly stating that the court is merely applying a statutory time
period from adverse possession in place of a nonexistent time period for inverse
condemnation claims. 241 Another possibility would be to create specific legis-
235 See generally Stanley v. Schwalby, 147 U.S. 508 (1893) (discussing actions of the gov-
ernment versus actions of its agents acting on its behalf and showing the difficulty in distin-
guishing between the two).
236 See sources cited supra notes 162 and 165 and accompanying text.
237 See infra Section IV.C.3.
238 See sources cited supra note 5.
239 Id.
240 DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 162.
241 See, e.g., Wadsworth v. Dep't of Transp., 915 P.2d 1, 4 (Idaho 1996).
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lation that precludes governmental entities from using substantive adverse pos-
session against private landowners.2 42 This clarification within the law is
necessary to avoid the creation of more conflicting and confusing case law, not
to mention the difficult pleading issues that are a result thereof.
3. Allowing Municipal Corporations to Acquire Property Through
Adverse Possession
One area of case law that appears to be well-settled involves the ability of
a municipal corporation or public school board's ability to possess private
property adversely.2 43 These decisions are unique primarily because they claim
that a municipal corporation is not an arm of the state but a quasi-corporation
that is akin to a private entity.2 Courts using this rationale have relied on
minute distinctions between a traditional state actor and a municipal corpora-
tion. As one court has noted, some municipal corporations are autonomous
from the state because they do not rely on the state treasury for their funds but
obtain their money through other means.2 45 Similarly, another court argued
that their independent status gave them the power to sue or be sued.24 6 Others
bolster the fact that municipal corporations are autonomous from the state
because they are not supervised by the governor or the legislature but act on
their own behalf like any other private corporation.24 7 While the prevailing
view accepts the notion that a municipal corporation can act in a private capac-
ity, several courts have held that adverse possession by a municipality does
constitute an actionable takings claim.24 8
So what is a municipal or quasi-corporation and how are these state corpo-
rations not acting on behalf of the state when they acquire property? A munici-
pal corporation has been defined as:
A body politic and corporate, established by sovereign power, evidenced by a char-
ter, with a defined area, a population, a corporate name, and perpetual succession,
242 This legislation could be modeled after state legislation that precludes adverse posses-
sion against property held by the state by creating a mirror provision that prevents adverse
possession of privately held property by the state. E.g., IND. CODE § 32-21-7-2 (2006) (illus-
trating an example of a state statute that prevents the use of adverse possession against
property held by the state).
243 See generally Vann, supra note 7, at 687, 689.
244 See, e.g., McDonald v. Bd. of Miss. Levee Comm'rs, 832 F.2d 901, 906-07 (5th Cir.
1987); Morgan v. Cherokee County Bd. of Educ., 58 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 1952); Beckett v.
City of Petaluma, 153 P. 20, 22-24 (Cal. 1915); Roche v. Town of Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911,
916-17 (Conn. 1982). See also R.K.G., supra note 11, at 231 ("A municipal corporation
falls into the same category as any other corporation which has the capacity to hold land in
its own right, and can acquire a title by the usual rules of adverse possession.").
245 McDonald, 832 F.2d at 906-07.
246 Morgan, 58 So. 2d at 136.
247 See McDonald, 832 F.2d at 907.
248 See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Mt. Pleasant, 713 S.W.2d 659, 663-64 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985). Some courts argue that municipal corporations can be distinguished from private
corporations based on the fact that they often have the ability to acquire property through
eminent domain, thus they cannot be a willful trespasser, but only enter land through its
eminent domain powers. See, e.g., Sch. Dist. of Donegal Twp. v. Crosby, 112 A.2d 645, 648
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1955). They also argue that governmental officials are presumed to do right,
therefore, no presumption of wrongdoing will be implied without strict proof of actual
wrong. See id. at 647-48.
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established primarily to regulate the local or internal affairs of the area incorporated,
and secondarily to share in the civil government of the state in the particular
locality.
2 4 9
Municipal law has long accepted the notion that corporations established
by the state have the ability to act in a go.vernmental/public capacity or in a
private/proprietary capacity250 (this optional capacity is often referred to as a
dual status). If the municipal corporation is acting for the public good on
behalf of the state, rather than for itself, it is considered a governmental func-
tion.25 1 However, if it is acting for its own private advantage then it is consid-
ered a private function.2 52
The dual status was originally created as an exception to sovereign immu-
nity.25 3 Initially, municipal corporations were granted status as sovereigns
because they were acting on behalf of the state when performing their chartered
functions.2 54 It was assumed that municipal corporations usually did not make
a profit through taxation; therefore, excessive litigation had the potential of
exhausting their resources.25 5 Suing the local government for public services
was also thought to be ungrateful.2  After some time, courts recognized that
sovereign immunity was contrary to basic tort concepts and that the spirit of the
Constitution guaranteed every person the right to a legal remedy for injuries to
person or property. 257 To reduce the harsh effects of sovereign immunity,
courts and legislatures created exceptions to the rule, one of which was the dual
status of municipal corporations.25 8 Under the exception, immunity from lia-
bility only attached to governmental functions and not for proprietary
functions.25 9
Understanding the distinction between a governmental and proprietary
function is crucial within this area of law, since courts are allowing municipal
corporations to use adverse possession when acting in their proprietary capac-
ity.260 These courts analogize the municipal corporation's private function to
249 See Latovick, supra note 43, at 477.
250 56 AM. JuR. 2D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions
§ 182 (2000).
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 See 18 McQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003).
254 Id.
255 Id.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id.
259 Id.
260 See, e.g., Morgan v. Cherokee County Bd. of Educ., 58 So. 2d 134, 136 (Ala. 1952)
("[A] county board of education is a quasi corporation, an independent agency of the state,
which can sue or be sued as to matters within the scope of its corporate power."); Beckett v.
City of Petaluma, 153 P. 20, 24 (Cal. 1915) ("We see no reason why public corporations are
not governed in this respect by the same rule as private corporations."); Roche v. Town of
Fairfield, 442 A.2d 911, 916 (Conn. 1982) ("A municipality, like an individual, may acquire
title by adverse possession ...."); Levering v. City of Tarpon Springs, 92 So. 2d 638, 639
(Fla. 1957) ("[T]he rule appears to be generally accepted that a municipality, like an individ-
ual, may acquire title to land by adverse possession .... ); Wyalusing Twp. Sch. Dist. v.
Babcock, 11 Pa. D. & C. 536, 540 (Ct. Com. P1. 1928) ("A municipal corporation may
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that of a private corporation that has the ability to possess private property
adversely. 2 6'
Applying the private function status to allow a governmental entity to use
adverse possession is troubling for a number of reasons. Municipal corpora-
tions are powerful players in American government, spending nearly forty-five
percent of all governmental funds while also wielding power sufficient to affect
the property rights of nearly every citizen in the United States.262 The private
function essentially gives municipal corporations or their agents the ability to
acquire property without being subjected to any procedural protections guaran-
teed under the federal and state constitutions. It also raises a host of questions
on the legitimacy of municipal governments and their ability to use the dual
status rule to their advantage.26 3 Courts applying the dual status exception fail
to recognize that the distinction has been rejected by many courts and highly
criticized by legal scholars.264
Criticisms of the dual status exemption appear to be endless; as a result,
many states have abolished the distinction in whole or in part.2 65 Critics recog-
nize that the distinction is contrary to its purpose of protecting the local govern-
ments from excessive liability because the uncertainty created by the dual
status functions has actually increased litigation and exposed the municipalities
to more liability.26 6 The problem with the dual status rule is identifying what
type of actions are deemed governmental as opposed to proprietary actions.2 67
One critic stated:
acquire title to land by adverse possession for corporate purposes, and even for other than
corporate purposes." (quoting 2 CORPUS JuRis, 228)) (emphasis added).
261 See cases cited supra note 260.
262 See Joan C. Williams, The Invention of the Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in
Legal Change, 34 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 370 (1985).
263 The legitimacy of municipal corporations is also questioned when they attempt to use
the governmental function exception from the dual status rule to prevent liability for prop-
erty damage or potential takings claims. See, e.g., Perkins v. Blauth, 127 P. 50, 53 (Cal.
1912) (defendant public officers attempted to claim an exemption from liability for property
damage under the governmental function exemption; however, the court reject their claim);
Griswold v. Town Sch. Dist. of Weathersfield, 88 A.2d 829, 830-31 (Vt. 1952) (landowner
sued municipality alleging a taking of property rights because the municipal employees
destroyed the plaintiffs water supply; the municipality claimed the governmental function
exception, but was denied).
264 See MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003) (discussing how the dual status
function has been abandoned in most jurisdictions due to the harsh criticism by courts and
commentators); Latovick, supra note 43, at 482-83 (recognizing that the dual status role of
municipal corporations has come under "blistering attack" and arguing that the distinction
should be abolished in the adverse possession context in order to protect municipally owned
land); Murray Seasongood, Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or
Proprietary Test, 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 469, 497 (1984) (arguing that legislation should be
introduced to abolish the dual status distinction since its initial justifications are no longer
relevant); Ruth Cook, Comment, Postscript: Tracing the Governmental-Proprietary Test,
53 U. CIN. L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1984) (recognizing the criticisms of the dual status function
and that it is disfavored, but noting that it still survives in some areas of the law).
265 See sources cited supra note 264.
266 See Seasongood, supra note 264, at 470 ("A mass of litigation far more than was antici-
pated has resulted, much of it indeed because of the attempted differentiation of municipal
functions ....").
267 See id. at 493.
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All this would be bad enough if the test were simple and easy to determine. But no
satisfactory basis for solving the problem whether [sic] the activity falls into one
class or other has been evolved. The rules sought to be established are as logical as
those governing French irregular verbs.
2 6 8
The idea that suing a municipality is a form of ingratitude when it is pro-
viding a governmental service can also be dismissed using modern legal rea-
soning. Simply stated, adverse possession of private property is not a
governmental function; thus, any protection granted from suit is not applicable.
The fact remains that the dual status rule was not designed to allow munic-
ipalities to avoid liability; 269 rather, it was created to increase the liability of
municipal governments by subjecting them to potential tort or property claims
when the municipality acts in a private capacity. 270 This goal is obstructed
when municipalities attempt to decrease their liability by hiding under the dual
status rule to acquire property through adverse possession. The purpose of
municipal corporations is to promote the "public peace, health, safety, and
morals, 271 not to acquire property rights surreptitiously through adverse pos-
session when municipalities can instead acquire the same rights through legiti-
mate means such as eminent domain.
This author proposes that the dual status rule be abolished and be replaced
by a bright-line rule that imposes a presumption that any time a municipal
272government enters land, it is acting in a governmental capacity. This propo
sal is analogous to a bright-line rule created by Professor Latovick, but applied
differently. 273 Professor Latovick argues that a bright-line rule should be
established to presume that all land held by a municipality would be in a gov-
emmental capacity.274 Her goal was to eliminate the possibility of munici-
pally-owned land being adversely possessed when held in a private capacity.27 5
This author's proposal would simply take that bright-line rule and apply it to
prevent the use of adverse possession by municipal corporations against pri-
vately held property and subject the municipality to a potential takings claim
any time it enters private property. This would presume that the municipality
was acting in a governmental capacity.
This proposal would provide clarity in the midst of judicial confusion
while also achieving results similar to that of adverse possession in favor of the
government. For example, if a governmental body enters private property and
an inverse condemnation claim is not brought before the statute of limitations
has run, the municipal body would acquire rights to that property without the
obligation of just compensation. On the other hand, if an inverse condemnation
claim is brought, the landowner would have an appropriate remedy to seek
compensation. More importantly, the bright-line rule would be consistent with
268 Id.
269 See supra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
270 See MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003).
271 See 56 AM. JUR. 2 D Municipal Corporations, Counties, and Other Political Subdivisions
§ 183 (2000).
272 See generally Latovick, supra note 43, at 475-76, 502-07 (arguing for abolition of the
dual status to prevent land held by municipal corporations from being adversely possessed).
273 Id.
274 Id.
275 Id.
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Professor Latovick's proposal to protect municipal property from being
adversely possessed by private citizens, as all property would be held in a gov-
276ernmental capacity. 6 Under the current dual status rule, property held by a
municipality in a private capacity is subject to adverse possession. 277
Creating a presumption that the entity is acting in a governmental capacity
would also decrease litigation and the costs of litigating the dual status distinc-
tion, which is why the courts initially created the distinction in the first
place 8.27 The rule would also maintain consistent application of current takings
law and at the same time remove the uncertain concept of adverse possession
by a governmental entity. Overall, bringing back traditional takings law would
promote a sense of legitimacy to local governments by holding them accounta-
ble for their negligent land use and their failure to follow formal condemnation
proceedings while also abolishing the highly criticized dual status distinction.
4. The Use of Adverse Possession to Cure Title Disputes
Adverse possession has also been applied in favor of the government as an
equitable means of solving title disputes.2 7 9 For example in Ault v. State,28 °
the Supreme Court of Alaska was faced with determining whether the state had
acquired valid title to an express roadway easement when the grantor appar-
ently did not have any authority to grant the easement. 28 1 The current property
owners argued that they had no express indication of such an easement on their
deed; therefore, the government's actions amounted to a taking. 82 The court
recognized that adverse possession conflicts with the Takings Clause; however,
the court held that adverse possession can be applied in favor of the state, but
only when it has an "honest and reasonable belief in the validity of the title. 2 83
In a different decision, a Louisiana court stated that: "[if public bodies or
political corporations were prohibited from acquiring by prescription, such
defects as may exist in a title to property acquired by purchase or donation
could never be cured by possession of any nature, extent, and duration
whatsoever. 28
4
While these decisions arise far less often than those dealing with the expi-
ration of inverse claims and those involving municipal corporations, they do
represent the use of adverse possession by a governmental body. Under this
application it does appear to be an equitable solution for difficult decisions,
although modern takings jurisprudence through inverse condemnation would
allow for the same type of result without struggling to create an exception to
the Takings Clause through adverse possession. 285 As mentioned in Section
IV.C.2, takings law would benefit the government in a similar manner as
276 Id.
277 Id. at 478.
278 See MCQUILLIN MUN. CORP. § 53.02.10 (3d ed. 2003).
279 See cases cited supra note 19.
280 688 P.2d 951 (Alaska 1984).
281 Id. at 953.
282 Id. at 953-54.
283 Id. at 956.
284 Lincoln Parish Sch. Bd. v. Ruston Coll., 162 So. 2d 419, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1964).
285 See supra Section II.B.2 (discussing how the inverse condemnation claims can be time-
barred).
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adverse possession. The use of takings law would limit the time period in
which an inverse claim can be filed under current inverse statute of limitations,
and if none exists, the courts would apply the appropriate adverse possession
statute of limitations. 2 86 This would give the government the rights it acquired
after the running of the inverse time period. In either instance, a quiet title
action would be necessary to obtain marketable title. Thus, the use of adverse
possession is not necessary to cure title disputes.
Conversely, if a private landowner had a valid interest in property held by
the government, he would be able to bring an inverse condemnation claim chal-
lenging the validity of the government's title. If the government was negligent
in failing to verify the chain of title, it might be able to acquire the rights in the
property after the running of the inverse time period. On the other hand, it
could be punished for its negligence if a record-title-holder disputed the gov-
ernment's use and filed a claim before the inverse time period. This application
appears to be consistent with takings jurisprudence by subjecting the govern-
ment to limitations when it acts negligently by failing to condemn land or to
verify title. In essence, there is no need to, introduce adverse possession to
eminent domain law when it would obtain the same results and with a tradition-
ally shorter statute of limitation, which would benefit the government.
V. CONCLUSION
Adverse possession has been applied in favor of governmental entities for
over one hundred years, but courts have failed to consider adequately the true
interplay between adverse possession and the takings doctrine. These decisions
have haphazardly applied adverse possession in favor of governmental entities
in order to cure title disputes, limit inverse condemnation claims, distinguish
actions taken by municipal entities, and favor the public at large. Adverse pos-
session muddies each of these areas of law as it creates unneeded exceptions to
rules and complicates coveted property rights held by private land owners.
The use of traditional takings law would cure many of the inconsistencies
that these applications create. What many of the existing decisions fail to rec-
ognize is that any time a governmental entity enters land or creates a burden-
some regulation, it avails itself of a potential takings claim. Applying adverse
possession in favor of the government implies that a governmental body can act
in a non-governmental capacity; certainly most scholars reject this notion.
Adverse possession is unneeded because inverse condemnation statutes place
the government in the same position as if it had adversely possessed the land.
The courts should adopt a bright-line rule that creates a presumption that the
governmental entity is acting in its governmental capacity when it burdens
property rights. Courts should also readily avoid the claim that a governmental
entity can adversely possess property and, instead, simply apply an inverse con-
demnation statute to limit claims by burdened landowners. This rule would be
consistent with takings jurisprudence and the overarching purpose of the Just
Compensation Clause.
286 See supra Section II.B.2.
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